Work Jaegwon Kim

1 work

1.1 philosophy of mind
1.2 argument against non-reductive physicalism
1.3 metaphysics
1.4 epistemology

work

kim s philosophical work focuses on areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, , philosophy of science.

philosophy of mind

kim has defended various mind-body theories during career. began defending version of identity theory in 1970s, , moved non-reductive version of physicalism, relied heavily on supervenience relation.

more recently, has rejected strict physicalism on grounds insufficient basis resolving mind-body problem. in particular, has concluded hard problem of consciousness—according detailed , comprehensive neurophysical description of brain still not account fact of consciousness—is insurmountable in context of thoroughgoing physicalism. arguments against physicalism can found in 2 latest monographs: mind in physical world (1998) , physicalism, or near enough (2005). kim claims physicalism not able survive intact , in entirety. this, according kim, because qualia (the phenomenal or qualitative aspect of mental states) cannot reduced physical states or processes. kim claims phenomenal mental properties not functionally definable , hence functionally irreducible , if functional reduction doesn t work qualia, nothing thus, there aspect of mind physicalism cannot capture.

kim defends thesis intentional mental states (e.g., beliefs , desires) can functionally reduced neurological realizers, qualitative or phenomenal mental states (e.g., sensations) irreducibly non-physical , epiphenomenal. he, thus, defends version of dualism, although kim argues physicalism near enough. of march, 2008, kim still sees physicalism comprehensive world view irreplaceable other world view.

in 2008 interview korean daily newspaper joongang ilbo, kim stated must seek naturalistic explanation mind because mind natural phenomenon, , supernatural explanation provides 1 riddle on . believes correct explanation nature of mind come natural science rather philosophy or psychology.

argument against non-reductive physicalism

figure demonstration how m1 , m2 not reduced p1 , p2.

kim has raised objection based on causal closure , overdetermination non-reductive physicalism.

the non-reductive physicalist committed following 3 principles: irreducibility of mental physical, version of mental-physical supervenience, , causal efficaciousness of mental states. problem, according kim, when these 3 commitments combined few other well-accepted principles, inconsistency generated entails causal impotence of mental properties. first principle, ontological physicalists accept, causal closure of physical domain, according which, every physical effect has sufficient physical cause. second principle kim notes of causal exclusion, holds no normal event can have more 1 sufficient cause. problem behavior cannot have cause, both physical event , (supervening) mental event, without resulting in case of overdetermination (thus violating principle of causal exclusion). result physical causes exclude mental states causally contributing behavior.

in detail: proposes (using chart on right) m1 causes m2 (these mental events) , p1 causes p2 (these physical events). m1 has p1 supervenience base, , m2 has p2 supervenience base. way m1 cause m2, causing supervenience base p2 (a case of mental-to-physical causation). if p1 causes p2, , m1 causes p2, have case of causal overdetermination. applying principle of causal-exclusion, either p1 or m1 must eliminated cause of p2. given principle of causal closure of physical domain, m1 excluded.

the non-reductive physicalist forced choose between 2 unappealing options: 1 reject causal-exclusion principle , claim in scenario dealing genuine case of overdetermination, or 1 embrace epiphenomenalism. kim argues mental causation can preserved rejecting premise of irreducibility in favor of reduction; in order mental properties considered causally efficacious, must reducible physical properties.

metaphysics

kim s work in metaphysics focuses on events , properties.

kim developed event identity theory, has not defended recently. theory holds events identical if , if occur in same time , place , instantiate same property. if 1 waves ten fingers, several events occur, including waving of number of fingers, event of waving fingers evenly divisible five, , evenly divisible ten. have criticized theory producing many events.

kim theorized events structured. known property-exemplification account of events. composed of 3 things: object(s), property , time or temporal interval. events defined using operation [x, p, t].

a unique event defined 2 principles: existence condition , identity condition. existence condition states [x, p, t] exists if , if object x exemplifies n-adic p @ time t . means unique event exists if above met. identity condition states [x, p, t] [y, q, t`] if , if x=y, p=q , t=t` .

epistemology

kim critic of naturalized epistemology popularized willard van orman quine in latter half of twentieth century. kim s influential article naturalized epistemology ? (1988) argues naturalized epistemologies quine s not proper epistemologies merely descriptive in scope, while 1 expects epistemology make normative claims knowledge. kim argues mere description of belief-forming practices cannot account justified belief. (he argues individuate beliefs, naturalized epistemologist must presuppose normative criteria of justification.) naturalized epistemology cannot address issue of justification, , therefore not share same aspiration traditional approach epistemology.