Employee rights United States corporate law

louis brandeis, testimony commission on industrial relations (1916) vol 8, 7659-7660

while investment managers tend exercise voting rights in corporations, bought pension, life insurance , mutual fund money, employees exercise voice through collective bargaining rules in labor law. increasingly, corporate law has converged labor law. united states in minority of organization economic cooperation , development countries that, yet, has no law requiring employee voting rights in corporations, either in general meeting or representatives on board of directors. on other hand, united states has oldest voluntary codetermination statute private corporations, in massachusetts since 1919 passed under republican governor calvin coolidge, enabling manufacturing companies have employee representatives on board of directors, if corporate stockholders agreed. in 1919 both procter & gamble , general ice delivery company of detroit had employee representation on boards. in 20th century, labor law theory split between advocated collective bargaining backed strike action, advocated greater role binding arbitration, , proponents codetermination industrial democracy . today, these methods seen complements, not alternatives. majority of countries in organization economic cooperation , development have laws requiring direct participation rights. in 1994, dunlop commission on future of worker-management relations: final report examined law reform improve collective labor relations, , suggested minor amendments encourage worker involvement. congressional division prevented federal reform, labor unions , state legislatures have experimented.

the united auto workers @ chrysler corporation made collective agreement in 1980 have employee directors on board. shareholding institutions tend monopolize voting rights in corporations.

corporations chartered under state law, larger in delaware, leave investors free organize voting rights , board representation choose. because of unequal bargaining power, historic caution of labor unions, shareholders monopolize voting rights in american corporations. 1970s employees , unions sought representation on company boards. happen through collective agreements, historically occurred in germany or other countries, or through employees demanding further representation through employee stock ownership plans, aimed voice independent capital risks not diversified. corporations included workers attempted secure board represented included united airlines, general tire , rubber company, , providence , worcester railroad. however, in 1974 securities , exchange commission, run appointees of richard nixon, rejected employees held shares in at&t entitled make proposals include employee representatives on board of directors. position reversed expressly dodd-frank act of 2010 §971, subject rules securities , exchange commission entitles shareholders put forward nominations board. instead of pursuing board seats through shareholder resolutions, example, united auto workers sought board representation collective agreement @ chrysler in 1980, , united steel workers secured board representation in 5 corporations in 1993. however, clear employee stock ownership plans open abuse, particularly after enron collapsed in 2003. workers had been enticed invest average of 62.5 per cent of retirement savings 401(k) plans in enron stock, against basic principles of prudent, diversified investment, , had no board representation. meant, employees lost majority of pension savings. reason, employees , unions have sought representation investment of labor, without taking on undiversifiable capital risk. empirical research suggests 1999 there @ least 35 major employee representation plans worker directors, though linked corporate stock.